Introduction
In the philosophy of language, examining the role and significance of derogatory words serves to counter our tendency to divorce theories of meaning from the social settings in which the phenomenon is found, and the communicative acts, attitudes and shared interests they incorporate. 1 Hornsby stresses the significance of this in a recent paper, which will form the basis for discussion.
According to Hornsby, derogatory words have the following distinguishing features:
First, they apply to people and are commonly understood to convey hatred and contempt.
Secondly, for each such word there is, or at least perfectly well could be, another that applies to the same people but whose use does not convey these things. (2001: pp. 128-9) Consider, for example, the pairs 'faggot ' and 'male homosexual', 'nigger' and 'black' and 'Kike' and 'Jew'. The paired expressions have the same extension, but in each case the derogatory counterpart (when uttered) carries or conveys additional, offensive connotations. Precisely how one is to understand 'convey' here is a central concern of this paper.
A further and important feature of derogatory words that Hornsby notes, and that will occupy us, is that they are 'useless for us'. 2 While they are 'intelligible to us', they are not 'sayable by us':
it is not merely that one does not count oneself among the word's users so that one is not in a position to make their claims. One cannot endorse anything that is done using these words. (2001: pp. 129-30; cf. Williamson, 2003) Hornsby does not draw our attention to this, or any other feature, with the aim of providing a definition of the concept of a derogatory expression by stating necessary and sufficient conditions. And that is not the aim of this paper either. I think that it is clear, or sufficiently so for present purposes, how the examples enumerated above could be continued, and so which class of expressions Hornsby has in mind.
That said, it is evident that the features Hornsby highlights are not shared by all derogatory expressions (and although she does not make this clear, presumably she does not intend to suggest otherwise). Consider, for example, the class containing terms such as 'wanker', 'twat' and 'bastard', which is distinguished from that discussed above in the following ways. First, while an expression belonging to this class of pejorative often corresponds to a purely descriptive term, or has (or has had) a purely descriptive use, it is not generally applied to an individual on the basis of that individual's falling within the extension of the descriptive complement. That is to say, the grounds for introducing such a derogatory word are not those specified by the neutral counterpart. Second, this sort of term is not typically applied to a person on the basis of that person's being perceived to belong to a particular group (ethnic, religious or social) . Hence, its use does not as such convey an attitude towards the kind to which the individual is perceived to belong, but rather to that individual alone. Finally, in many cases, the mechanism by which such an expression purports to be offensive is through associating the target with that which is picked out by the descriptive counterpart. In all these respects, the class of derogatory expressions alluded to above differs from that with which Hornsby is concerned. For the remainder, however, I shall restrict attention to the latter, and restrict the use of the term 'derogatory expression' accordingly.
Note in passing that these remarks, and likewise Hornsby's, are not offered as a serious contribution to the empirical discipline of linguistics, but only to provide a rough delineation of the topic. Indeed, the interest of this paper is not even in derogatory expressions as such; they are the focus only insofar as they provide a test-case for certain theories of meaning. Whether such terms actually function or are understood in the way here suggested is an empirical matter; whether they possibly could, according to the relevant theories, is the philosophical issue of current concern.
Accordingly, Hornsby states that consideration of the phenomenon of derogatory words allows us to adjudicate between two prominent, competing theories of meaning. More specifically, she suggests that it raises serious difficulties for inferentialism, but not for a perspective on meaning that currently approaches orthodoxy, namely
representationalism.
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In what follows, I argue against Hornsby that inferentialism can indeed accommodate derogatory words, so long as it abandons any pretensions to offer a complete account of their significance. Inferentialism needs to be supplemented -with 'conjunctive noncognitivism' -in order to explain the distinctive emotional charge of pejoratives.
Hornsby is, however, equally critical of conjunctive non-cognitivism. I attempt to meet her criticisms and, moreover, show that the approach she favours, representationalism, stands equally in need of its support.
While the upshot of the discussion is that, contra Hornsby, focus on derogatory expressions alone does not provide grounds for deciding between competing theories of meaning, it nevertheless serves to highlight important features that any such theory must acknowledge and incorporate. Roughly, the view arrived at is a 'two-component' view, according to which derogatory words have a literal, descriptive meaning in addition to which they conventionally convey to an audience negative, evaluative attitudes.
Meaning-theories and representationalism
Hornsby suggests that derogatory words raise a prima facie problem for the position she dubs 'representationalism'. To appreciate why, some scene-setting is in order. Many philosophers hold that the best philosophical approach to meaning is to reflect on the principles governing the construction of theories that generate specifications of the meaning of each expression in a language from a finite body of axioms concerning sentence constituents and their modes of combination. One version of this proposal -representationalism -holds that such theories should generate theorems in the form of specifications of truth-conditions (see Davidson, 2001 bearing on reality -rather than simply their relations to other expressions -and so exhibits the contribution they make to the propositional content expressed by any utterance of the sentence (see Evans and McDowell, 1976: pp. ix-x) .
And therein lies the problem. Representationalist meaning-theories, according to Hornsby, will have to 'leave out' derogatory words, since they are useless. Theorists (like you and me) will not be able to generate theorems of the above kind for sentences containing derogatory words because they are not prepared to employ those words. (whatever they might be) in a suitably perspicuous way. Indeed, that it leaves out certain offensive words may even be a virtue; it serves as a reminder to theorists that the semantic structures with which a meaning-theory deals are an abstraction from and firmly rooted in social practices and communicative exchange, and are thereby bound up with the concerns, attitudes and outlooks of ordinary speakers.
While one is, of course, entitled to stipulate the philosophical purposes to which one puts meaning-theories, the difficulty is that Hornsby's response makes meaning-theories a lot less interesting than their advocates typically suggest. Even if one rejects (as Hornsby recommends and as I think one must) the view that meaning-theories represent explicitly something known implicitly by ordinary speakers, it remains the case that a central motivation for reflection on meaning-theories is to provide a theoretical articulation of linguistic understanding. McDowell, for example, holds that no speaker actually possesses knowledge of a meaning-theory (tacitly or overtly), but nonetheless believes that a meaning-theory should be such that knowledge of it would suffice for linguistic understanding (1998: pp. 178-8). Indeed, he holds that the representationalist aims to provide 'a theoretical representation of the practical capacity that constitutes understanding' a language (1998: p. 296; cf. pp. 16, 31, 121, 316; Davidson, 2005: pp. 95-6; Evans and McDowell, 1976: p. ix) . It is precisely in virtue of capturing linguistic understanding in this way that meaning-theories are supposed to illuminate the notions of meaning, understanding and their cognates, and reveal them to be unproblematic.
Accordingly, to the extent that there are meaningful expressions, i.e. expressions that are understood, that a representationalist meaning-theory cannot in principle incorporate, that theory fails to qualify as one of understanding and so one of meaning at all. This should be of concern to the representationalist, whatever her views on the cognitive reality of the axioms and theorems of the theory.
If one accepts these views -which are motivated quite independently of the ambitious approach Hornsby justifiably repudiates -then the fact that any such representationalist meaning-theory leaves out derogatory words poses a genuine problem after all. Its advocates face a dilemma. Either they must deny that we understand derogatory words, or they must relinquish the claim that the theories they construct are a genuine articulation of the capacity to understand a language. The former is, of course, wildly implausible. As Williamson says (in a rather different context), 'We find racist and xenophobic abuse offensive because we understand it, not because we fail to do so' (2003: p. 257). The latter, however, appears to divest meaning-theories of a great deal of their philosophical significance and undermines a widespread motivation for reflecting on them.
This is, admittedly, not a knock-down argument against representationalism. Hornsby might have in mind a rather different and still less ambitious motivation for philosophical reflection on meaning-theories. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that many representationalists would be satisfied with that substitute (McDowell, presumably, included) . Finally, if there are alternative accounts that can incorporate derogatory words, one might think them preferable for that reason. It is to that possibility that I shall now turn.
Conjunctive non-cognitivism
In this section, I shall defend against Hornsby's criticisms an alternative account of derogatory words, 'conjunctive non-cognitivism', derived from Hare (1963) . 7 According to it, there are two aspects to derogatory words; they 'combine descriptive meaning with another sort' (Hornsby, 2001: p. 131 shall return briefly to this issue in the conclusion).
With this apparatus in place, the conjunctive non-cognitivist can not only accommodate but also explain the uselessness of derogatory words on which Hornsby rightly insists. It is the fact that hateful attitudes are conventionally and not just accidentally or conversationally attached to the pejorative that prevents those who do not possess such attitudes from simply suspending or cancelling the implicature as they see fit.
Hornsby, however, expresses further reservations about the conjunctive non-cognitivist account. Recall that, according to it, 'where D is a derogatory word and N its neutral counterpart, someone who predicates D of x, (i) says that x is N, and (ii) condemns those who are N'. This, Hornsby notes, is far too simplistic, since there are many other things beyond condemning that can be done with derogatory words. The same pejorative may be used to insult, to evince hostility, to express solidarity (with other bigots), and so on. One cannot bring all these possibilities under the umbrella 'condemn'. Hence, since 'we are stuck for a way to give the non-descriptive' supplement, the evaluative aspect of a derogatory word cannot simply be something additional to a neutral core (2001, p. 135) .
Its meaning cannot be broken down into separable 'semantic' and 'pragmatic' components.
Hornsby seems here to be arguing for an 'inextricability thesis', akin to that often defended regarding what Williams (1985) calls 'thick' ethical terms, such as 'courageous' or 'stingy'. For these expressions, it is often (and plausibly) claimed that one cannot factor out their meaning into descriptive and prescriptive components, so that one could grasp the former independently of the latter.
Clearly, however, in the case of the derogatory expressions that concern us, Hornsby cannot be arguing that the descriptive component is inextricable. As she herself points out, one can give that simply by giving the neutral counterpart. Instead, it is the prescriptive aspect that it is supposed to resist extraction. Thus, Hornsby writes,
A unified account of a derogatory word cannot be achieved by identifying a pragmatic ingredient to be added to a semantic one given by the word's neutral counterpart, because only the word itself provides the outlook from which one can make sense of the variety of associated speech acts. (2001: p. 135) Given that the descriptive component can so obviously be carved out, one might be suspicious as to why in turn the prescriptive cannot be. And I think that this suspicion is well placed. It can certainly be granted that simply to identify the implicated attitude with one of condemnation seems unpromising. But this is to find fault with the details of a particular proposal, not the model in general. Perhaps one might instead describe the attitude conventionally conveyed more broadly, as one of derision or hostility towards those to which the neutral counterpart applies. One might complain that this runs counter to the specificity of the speech acts that can be performed using that word. But fineness of grain can be achieved by taking into account contextual factors. The conventions attaching to the derogatory word determine that a derisive attitude is understood to be conveyed, and so delimits a range of possible speech acts (insult, belittle, express loathing, etc.) that one can perform in uttering it. Precisely which attitude is conveyed, and so which speech act is performed, is then fixed by circumstances.
(Strictly, on the somewhat Gricean account defended here, there is a speech act that is literally performed by the use of a derogatory word, namely that which would be performed by uttering its neutral counterpart, while in addition (in virtue of the conventionally implicated attitude) one thereby performs an action of derogation. This complication does not affect the above remarks.)
So, it seems that it is possible to meet Hornsby's criticisms of conjunctive noncognitivism. It has not yet been shown to be untenable. Moreover, since (as mentioned above) it does justice to the respect in which one's quarrel with the users of a derogatory word is not really factual, and also the observation that one can learn the extension of a pejorative simply by learning its neutral counterpart, there appear to be positive reasons to endorse conjunctive non-cognitivism.
Inferentialism
Having defended conjunctive non-cognitivism against Hornsby's objections, in this section I shall try to do the same for inferentialism. According to inferentialism, very roughly, the meaning of a word is determined by the inferential proprieties governing its use (see Brandom, 1994; 2000) . If one grasps the meaning of a given expression, one knows that certain inferential transitions involving it are correct or incorrect.
Following Dummett (1973: p. 454 
136-7)
Inferentialism seems to over-intellectualize the respect in which derogatory words are offensive (and therefore the respect in which they occasion offence).
In addition to expressing this general scepticism, Hornsby offers a diagnosis of the mistake that Brandom commits. According to his version of inferentialism, a speaker's conveying an attitude in her use of a derogatory word is represented as that speaker conveying an attitude with a propositional content, i.e. as expressing the claim or belief entailed by one's introducing the term. Brandom's inferentialism is therefore a cognitivist account. Far more realistic, surely, is a non-cognitivist view according to which derogatory words express 'emotional attitudes', such as hatred, disgust or contempt.
No doubt Hornsby's criticisms are effective against this Brandomian version of inferentialism. But one would not be warranted in taking this to be decisive against inferentialism itself. Consider a more modest version combined with conjunctive noncognitivism. On such an account, inferentialism explains that aspect of a derogatory word shared by its neutral counterpart, i.e. in terms of its invariant contribution to the inferential potential of sentences of which it is a part. The semantic proprieties of inference governing 'Boche' would accordingly be represented as the same proprieties governing the use of 'German'. Further, and crucially, this inferentialist account is silent about the prescriptive component. The latter can be viewed as distinct from and additional to the word's inferential significance, and explained pragmatically in terms of the hateful attitudes its use conventionally implicates.
Imagine you overhear an utterance of, 'Faggots have moved in next door.' The inferentialist component is able to explain your understanding of that aspect of the claim that you might not challenge (that male homosexuals have taken up residence in the adjacent property). But the modest version defended here leaves the aspect that appals to be dealt with separately. At this point, the Hare-cum-Grice apparatus is called upon to explain how hateful attitudes accrue to pejoratives through custom and convention, and thereby infect those words to such an extent that they become unusable by us. This suggestion, as opposed to Brandomian inferentialism, carries no suggestion that ordinary speakers' use of derogatory words is governed by an articulable ideology.
So, Hornsby's criticisms do not give reason to reject inferentialism, although they do speak against Brandom's particular account of derogatory words, according to which we accept a speaker's grounds for introducing such an expression but never the consequences of doing so. There are, however, independent and principled reasons for the inferentialist to distance herself from Brandom's views on these issues, namely considerations of conservatism. 12 Conservatism is the requirement that the rules for the use of a particular expression be compatible with the established inferential rules governing the use of existing expressions. More specifically, an extension of the language is conservative if one cannot use the new vocabulary to derive any statements in the original vocabulary that could not already be derived using the original vocabulary.
Consider again the case of 'Boche'. The original introduction and elimination rules given above for its employment are simply incompatible with those governing 'German'. Given what is meant by 'German', taking 'x is German' to entail 'x is cruel' is incorrect. So it is impossible for 'German' to mean what it does and at the same time for there to be rules according to which that transition is correct. That is, one who understands 'German'
would not consider an utterance of 'x is German' alone to entitle one to utter 'x is cruel' (without collateral information). But, according to the above rules, one would be so entitled. There is a clash between those rules and the established rules governing the use of 'German'. Hence, one can appreciate that the constraint of conservatism applies in this instance.
The above explanation of the meaning of 'Boche' is, therefore, to be rejected as bogus.
And the same will hold of any such account of a derogatory word, where the grounds for introducing it are just those for its neutral counterpart, but where its use entails claims that we (who readily use the neutral counterpart) cannot endorse. Any putative inferential role conforming to this pattern is always going to be non-conservative, and so (by the inferentialist's lights) not genuine.
Thus, in addition to Hornsby's own reservations, the inferentialist herself has good reason to reject Brandom's version. 13 That is, the inferentialist has additional grounds -specific to her favoured theory of meaning -for taking a derogatory word like 'Boche' to have the same (neutral) role as 'German', and so for viewing its 'emotional charge' as an additional (albeit conventional) aspect to its inferential significance.
So, the proposal of this section is that the inferentialist should combine inferentialism with conjunctive non-cognitivism, of the kind defended above, when accounting for derogatory words. The former explains that aspect of a derogatory word that is shared by its neutral counterpart -its semantics; the latter its direct, emotional impact -its pragmatics. Of course, I have not offered any positive arguments in favour of inferentialism generally, and doing so is beyond the scope of this paper. 14 Nevertheless, I
hope to have shown that it can withstand Hornsby's objections.
Representationalism revisited
In the light of the above, one might ask why the representationalist cannot avail herself of the same strategy. That is, perhaps a truth-conditional meaning-theory should seek only to explain that aspect of a derogatory word's significance -its contribution to the truthconditions of sentences -that is shared by its neutral counterpart, and remain silent about the remainder. The representationalist could then appeal to conjunctive non-cognitivism to explain its distinctively pejorative tone. In this way, it might yield theorems of the (heterophonic) form: to take back the offence caused. This Gricean apparatus will be employed below. 9 Hornsby grants that such 'cancellation' sometimes occurs. She offers the example of 'Politically active African-Americans [who] use the word "niggers" of themselves ' (2001: p. 134). However, she holds, such cases are different because, first, that the relevant speakers do not have the hateful attitudes is manifest, and second, the speakers 'trade' on the conveyed meaning, rather than simply cancelling it. I shall return to this in conclusion. 10 In this respect, the account defended here differs from the more traditionally Gricean view that Williamson (2003) considers, and that Whiting (2006a) discusses, according to which what is implicated is in propositional form.
11 To say that the attitudes are implicated should not be confused with the claim that hearers have to 'work out' the implicature somehow. On the contrary, given speakers' familiarity with the conventions that accrue to an expression, and with the sociohistorical make-up of the linguistic community in which that expression has a life, those attitudes will typically be cognitively primary, the object of immediate awareness, not arrived at inferentially.
12 See Belnap's response (1962) to Prior (1960) . Cf. Dummett, 1973: p. 454 . The application of the requirement of conservatism in this instance is not quite straightforward, as we are not here dealing with an extension of the language, but rather with a suggestion as to how to represent the rules governing the use of an existing expression within a language. Nonetheless, it is clear enough how it applies in this case. 13 Of course, one might deny that conservatism is a requirement, as Brandom does (2000: pp. 71ff.). I do not think that this is feasible for an inferentialist. While demonstrating so is beyond the scope of this paper, some provisional remarks are in order. Brandom tells us that the proper question concerning a novel concept is not 'Is it a conservative extension of the language?', but 'Ought one to accept the inferential proprieties governing it?' However, the problem with 'Boche' is not that one should not infer according to its introduction and elimination rules but that -given the rules for the concept expressed by 'German' -there are and can be no such rules as Bocheintroduction and Boche-elimination to follow or otherwise. Consider what it would be for a speaker to possess the (supposed) concept Boche. She would take 'x is German' to entail 'x is cruel'. But, then, whatever she means or understands by 'German', it is not what we do. If there is a concept expressed by her use of that term, it is not German (although, of course, it may be recognizably akin). Hence, the possibility of nonconservative concepts is only apparent. For additional defence of the conservative constraint against objections, see Whiting, 2006a.
